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Over the last decade the United States has pursued an aggressive strategy for
improving international protection of intellectual property. The United States has
sought worldwide recognition of high standards of intellectual property protection
and enforcement through a series of unilateral,1 bilateral, 2 and multilateral mea-
sures. Of all these initiatives, the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), negotiated in 1992 by Canada, Mexico, and the United States, provides
the most satisfactory protection for intellectual property rights to date.3
In the multilateral arena, intellectual property protection is a major component
of the current Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, under the un-
wieldy name of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
The so-called Dunkel Draft that is on the table in these negotiations contains a
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1. Benefits under the General System of Preferences and Caribbean Basin Initiative can be denied
for countries that do not provide adequate and effective protection for intellectual property.
The so-called Special 301 provision of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988), requires
the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to identify countries that deny adequate and effective
protection of intellectual property rights or deny fair and equitable market access for U.S. persons
relying on intellectual property protection. The USTR may initiate investigations and decide that
retaliation is appropriate. Such measures act to pressure countries that do not adequately protect
intellectual property rights to improve their protection scheme; this strategy has been successful with
several countries, most notably China, Korea, and Taiwan.
2. A growing number of bilateral treaties between the United States and its trading partners
require high standards of intellectual property protection. Such provisions are contained in specific
agreements on intellectual property (e.g., Memoranda of Understanding with China and Taiwan,
Bilateral Copyright Agreements with Indonesia and Singapore, and Intellectual Property Rights
Agreement with Sri Lanka), as well as in many bilateral investment treaties (e.g., those with Argentina,
Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Sri Lanka) and bilateral trade agreements between the United
States and the states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (e.g., those with Armenia,
Bulgaria, Mongolia, Romania, and Russia).
3. North American Free Trade Agreement [hereinafter NAFTAJ. All reference to the NAFTA
are to the October 7, 1992, draft.
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text on TRIPS (the Dunkel TRIPS Text).* This draft agreement would better
protect intellectual property than the current regime of multilateral agreements.
However, the Dunkel TRIPS Text contains significant flaws.
The NAFTA has been, to date, the crowning achievement in the U.S.-led
process for improved intellectual property protection. The NAFTA negotiators
started with the Dunkel TRIPS Text's provisions on intellectual property, but then
built upon them. While certainly not perfect, the NAFTA is a watershed in the
history of protection of intellectual property rights, standing on the shoulders of
the Dunkel TRIPS Text and vastly increasing the level of protection afforded to
holders of such rights.
This article seeks to put the NAFTA in the context of the ongoing efforts by
the United States to improve intellectual property protection abroad. The purpose
of this article is not to examine intellectual property agreements and laws in detail,
nor is this article intended to serve as a practice guide to the NAFTA or a primer
on intellectual property law. Rather, it will explore important international issues
of intellectual property protection, and examine and contrast their treatment in
the two most recent attempts to address such issues-the Dunkel TRIPS Text and
the NAFTA.
The NAFTA is likely to shape future international trade agreements, whether
bilateral or multilateral. Indeed, the improvements made by the NAFTA over the
Dunkel TRIPS Text call into question the continued viability of the latter. The
process by which the NAFTA built on the Dunkel TRIPS Text shows that the
United States will not accept existing agreements, with their shortfalls, as a ceiling
on what is possible in the realm of intellectual property protection. Rather, existing
agreements like the NAFTA are a floor to be built on, and the United States will
likely pursue a strategy of ratcheting up the protection provided to intellectual
property rights in each subsequent initiative.
I. Copyright Protection
A. SCOPE OF PROTECTION
The Dunkel TRIPS Text's copyright provisions directly incorporate the terms
of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris
1971) (Berne Convention), 5 but they expand on them as well. While the Berne
Convention does not explicitly mention computer programs and data compila-
tions, the Dunkel TRIPS Text provides that they are to be protected as literary
works under the terms of the Berne Convention. 6 This extension of the Berne
4. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods, Annex III to the Final Draft Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, in "THE DUNKEL DRAFT" FROM THE GATT SECRETARIAT 57-
90 (1992) [hereinafter Dunkel Draft].
5. Id. art. 9, para. 1.
6. Id. art. 10.
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Convention is important, as pirating of computer software is a prevalent interna-
tional practice, resulting in major losses for software authors and publishers.
Popular and expensive programs such as WordPerfect and Lotus 1-2-3, which
retail in the United States for several hundred dollars a copy, can be bought in
pirated form in some countries for a mere fraction of their legitimate price.
However, the Dunkel TRIPS Text still does not go far enough towards rectify-
ing the problem of protecting new varieties of works. The Dunkel TRIPS Text
protects computer software by explicitly including it in the list of works to be
protected. That step, while welcome, is not as good as one that would provide
blanket protection to all forms of works that embody original expression, includ-
ing new and unanticipated forms.
The NAFTA takes the latter approach, providing for automatic protection of
forms of works "that embody original expression within the meaning of [the
Berne] Convention." 7 Thus, new forms of works that merit protection, but which
the agreement does not explicitly mention, will be covered. The text explicitly
includes computer programs,' databases and other compilations, 9 encrypted
program-carrying satellite signals,1° and sound recordings as protected forms of
works (although the last do not benefit from as great a measure of protection). "
In addition, the NAFTA explicitly states that computer programs are literary
works, and are thus entitled to the highest level of protection; the Dunkel TRIPS
Text only implies this, stating that computer programs are to be protected as
literary works. Protection for software was an important issue in the NAFTA
negotiations, especially since Mexico does not currently regard software as falling
within the Berne Convention. The NAFTA's broad protection for software is a
major advance, which should be repeated in future agreements.
An extensive scope of protection is appropriate. Original works should be
accorded full protection, regardless of whether their form falls within a class of
work historically afforded protection. The rapid pace of technological advance-
ment, and the creative and artistic use of new technologies and media, require a
scheme of copyright protection that will not fall behind the times. Both common
and civil law countries have recognized this requirement in different ways: the
former provide copyright protection to a wide range of forms of works, while the
latter use the concept of neighboring or related rights to reach the same result.
However, the most effective protection would be provided by explicitly covering
all new forms of works within one protection scheme, as the NAFTA does. By
adopting such a strategy the NAFTA makes a significant improvement on the
Dunkel TRIPS Text. This approach should be followed in future intellectual
7. NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1705, para. 1.
8. Id. cl. a.
9. Id. cl. b.
10. Id. art. 1707.
11. Id. art. 1706.
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property agreements, so that the broadest measure of protection can be granted,
and so that those agreements will not be made obsolete by technological and
creative advances.
B. EXTENT OF EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS FOR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
In order to benefit fully and freely from their status copyright holders must be
entitled to a set of exclusive rights over the use of the protected work. Such rights
should ordinarily include the right to control reproduction, distribution by sale
or rental, and importation of copies. Unfortunately, many countries still limit the
control that right holders can exercise.
The Dunkel TRIPS Text does not go far enough in protecting the rights of
copyright holders. It incorporates the protection present in the Berne Conven-
tion,12 supplementing it with several additional provisions; however, these addi-
tions do not adequately fill the gaps in the Berne Convention. For example, the
Dunkel TRIPS Text requires signatories to provide to authors and successors-in-
title of films or computer programs, and to right holders in sound recordings, the
right to authorize or prohibit rental of their works. 13 However, the Dunkel TRIPS
Text subjects these rental rights to some unwarranted limitations. For computer
programs the right applies only where the program is the essential object of the
rental. For sound recordings the Dunkel TRIPS Text contains a grandfather clause
that permits rental rights to be nonexclusive if a system of equitable remuneration
for the right holder exists and if rentals do not materially impair the right holder's
exclusive right of reproduction. These limitations are inappropriate because sound
recordings and computer programs are by nature used repeatedly, and rentals of
them are usually for the purpose of copying.
The NAFTA also begins with the rights enumerated in the Berne Convention,
but goes further than the Dunkel TRIPS Text in supplementing them to provide
for broader exclusive rights. The NAFTA provides the right to control the impor-
tation of unauthorized copies, to make the first public distribution of the original
and each copy, and to fully control the commercial rental of copies of computer
programs.14 Furthermore, the NAFTA provides that the sale of a copy does not
exhaust the right to control commercial rental. The NAFTA also provides full
protection of exclusive rights in sound recordings and incorporates the same
provisions on rental rights for them as it does for computer programs."
The NAFTA leapfrogs the Dunkel TRIPS Text by giving copyright holders a
properly exhaustive set of exclusive rights. Requiring that rental rights in sound
recordings be exclusive is an important improvement over the Dunkel TRIPS
Text's provisions, which permit such rights to be nonexclusive. The NAFTA also
12. Dunkel Draft, supra note 4, art. 9.
13. Id. arts. 11 and 14, para. 4.
14. NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1705, para. 2.
15. Id. art. 1706, para. 1.
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improves on the corollary rental provisions of the Dunkel TRIPS Text. Whereas
the Dunkel TRIPS Text provides that the rental right for computer programs does
not apply where the program is not the essential object of a rental, the NAFTA
allows an exception from the rental right only for rentals in which the program
is not an essential object. 16
Negotiators of future agreements would do well to follow the NAFTA's lead
on these points. Requiring that copyright holders be able to exercise broad exclu-
sive rights will enable them to benefit fully from their copyright. The NAFTA's
provisions on sound recordings are especially noteworthy, given the limited pro-
tection some countries now afford sound recordings and the Dunkel TRIPS Text's
limited provisions in this area.
C. MORAL RIGHTS
The Dunkel TRIPS Text, despite its incorporation of most of the Bere Conven-
tion, explicitly excludes protection of moral rights from the obligations placed on
signatories. 7 Because the original Berne Convention will remain in effect for its
signatories, moral rights will still be protected within the scheme of that conven-
tion; however, these rights will not be extended to the new protections established
by the Dunkel TRIPS Text. The NAFTA follows the same path, excluding protec-
tion for moral rights from the obligations placed on the United States.'"
D. CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS
To reap the full economic benefits of a copyright, the right holder must be able
to contract freely to transfer that right. Currently, however, many nations do not
fully respect such freedom to contract, restricting it in a variety of ways. For
example, European nations have regulated the transferability of copyrights in a
manner that has particularly harmed the U.S. motion picture industry.' 9
The Dunkel TRIPS Text, unfortunately, does not force the issue as it should,
and does not require signatories to provide full contractual rights to copyright
holders. One important effect of this failure is that signatories will not be required
to grant the full protection for works-made-for-hire that is provided in such
countries as the United States.
On the other hand, under the NAFTA, signatories must permit copyright hold-
ers to engage in free and unhindered transfers of rights.20 In addition, transferees
and other holders of rights, including employers in work-made-for-hire situations,
16. Id. art. 1705, para. 2.
17. Dunkel Draft, supra note 4, art. 9, para. 1.
18. NAFTA, supra note 3, annex 1701.3, para. 2.
19. REPORT OF THE INDUSTRY FUNCTIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR TRADE IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS ON THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 9 (1992) [hereinafter IFAC
Report].
20. NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1705, para. 3, cl. a.
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must be able to enjoy the full benefit of the rights they hold. 2' This guarantees,
for example, the right to collect royalties due to the transferor.
Strong respect for contractual rights, as provided for in the NAFTA, is neces-
sary to strengthen the protection of copyright holders. One consequence of re-
specting contract rights will be the prevention of discrimination against foreign
copyright holders in video and audio levy and rental rights regimes. Such regimes
are currently in place in some European countries, and may in the future be
implemented in other countries as well as throughout the EC. Transferees should
be able to benefit from such systems, on a nondiscriminatory basis, to the same
extent that their transferors could benefit. Guarantees of contractual rights would
accomplish this goal, and should be an element of future intellectual property
agreements.
E. NATIONAL TREATMENT
The Dunkel TRIPS Text, while extending national treatment for many intellec-
tual property rights,22 would permit major derogations for neighboring rights.23
The Dunkel TRIPS Text could also arguably permit derogations to national treat-
ment to be taken as to subject matter, rights, or beneficiaries of rights that do not
come under the direct obligations in the text.2
The NAFTA improves upon the Dunkel TRIPS Text, as it requires full national
treatment almost across the board. 25 It provides for such treatment for "all intellec-
tual property rights," which is defined in the copyright arena as copyright and
related rights,26 avoiding the Dunkel TRIPS Text's denial of national treatment
for neighboring rights. The only exception to this broad treatment is for perform-
ers' rights in respect to secondary uses (public performance and broadcasting) of
a sound recording.27 In this case, the NAFTA applies a reciprocity standard.
The national treatment provisions in the NAFTA ensure that most right holders
will receive nondiscriminatory treatment. This issue is currently a concern in the
area of collective compensation systems, such as video and audio levies. These
systems are becoming increasingly popular and in the future may spread to other
areas such as digital transmission. Denial of national treatment would allow
discrimination in favor of domestic interests, unfairly keeping foreign copyright
holders from benefiting from these systems.
The NAFTA's exception for performers' rights is unfortunate, but limited. The
United States currently has no law providing for performers' rights in secondary
21. Id. cl. b.
22. Dunkel Draft, supra note 4, art 3, para. 1.
23. Id. art. 3, para. 1 & art. 9, para. 1.
24. IFAC Report, supra note 19, at 11.
25. NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1703.
26. Id. art. 1721, para. 2.
27. Id. art. 1703, para. 1.
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uses; under the NAFTA, U.S. performers will not necessarily benefit from any
such Mexican or Canadian law. However, under the broad national treatment
provision of the NAFTA, U.S. producers and authors would be entitled to the
benefits of such a law.
H. Trade Secret Protection
Trade secrets and proprietary data are often highly valuable to their holders.
While their value and their nature warrant inclusion in a scheme of intellectual
property protection, national laws providing for their protection are underdevel-
oped. Furthermore, no international agreements on intellectual property currently
protect trade secrets.28
The Dunkel TRIPS Text extends protection into this area. It defines protected
information as being secret, that is, not generally known among or readily accessi-
ble to persons who would normally deal with such information; having commer-
cial value because of its secrecy; and having been subject to reasonable steps by
the person in control of the information to protect its secrecy.29 Under the Dunkel
TRIPS Text persons in possession of such information will be able to prevent
unconsented disclosure, acquisition, or use of the information in a manner con-
trary to honest commercial practices.3 °
This provides a good deal of protection for trade secrets. However, the Dunkel
TRIPS Text's provisions suffer from two weaknesses. First, the definition of "a
manner contrary to honest commercial practices" includes the acquisition of
information by a third party who did not know, or was grossly negligent in not
knowing, that the information's acquisition involved such practices. 3 An ordinary
negligence standard would be preferable and would provide better protection to
holders of trade secrets. In addition, the Dunkel TRIPS Text's definition of a
"manner contrary to honest commercial practices" would not expressly provide
protection against continued use or dissemination of information acquired in
such a manner. The inexact language could be interpreted to provide effective
protection only against further acquisition.32
'28. Article 10 bis of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property provides for
some protection against unfair trade practices, but does not explicitly mention trade secrets. Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, art. 10, 21 U.S.T. 1629.
29. Dunkel Draft, supra note 4, art. 39, para. 2.
30. Id.
31. Id. n.1.
32. The Dunkel TRIPS Text requires that those lawfully in possession of trade secrets shall be
able to prevent such secrets from being used by, disclosed to, or acquired by others in a manner
contrary to honest commercial practices. Id. "A manner contrary to honest commercial practices"
includes breach of contract, breach of confidence, inducement to breach, and acquisition by third
parties with actual knowledge or with gross negligence in failing to know that such practices were
used in the acquisition. Id. This definition can be interpreted to allow use of dissemination of the
information after the initial disclosure or acquisition, as the definition does not include use and
dissemination.
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Furthermore, the Dunkel TRIPS Text could provide better protection for pro-
prietary data that governments require for marketing approval. For example,
governments commonly require such information for marketing approval of phar-
maceuticals and agricultural chemicals. Protection of such data is certainly war-
ranted, as generating it can involve considerable effort and expense. The Dunkel
TRIPS Text provides for protection of registration data when that data is provided
for pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical products that utilize new chemical
entities.33 However, the Dunkel TRIPS Text fails to provide protection for such
data when furnished with respect to old chemical entities. Also, the Dunkel TRIPS
Text does not specify the time period for which covered information must be
protected. In contrast is the protection granted by the United States for marketing
data for agricultural chemicals and pharmaceuticals that utilize new chemical
entities (ten years for the former, and up to five for the latter) when such data
require considerable effort to originate. The United States also provides some
protection for such products that utilize old chemical entities.
34
In addition, the Dunkel TRIPS Text does not provide explicit protection against
"me-too" registration-the use by a second company of proprietary data provided
to a government to obtain marketing approval where the second company has not
gone through the cost and effort of generating such information itself. The Dunkel
TRIPS Text requires only that governments protect such information against
unfair commercial use and against disclosure.35
The NAFTA, if ratified, is likely to be the first international agreement to
provide protection for trade secrets. The agreement contains fairly broad provi-
sions in this field, similar to those in the Dunkel TRIPS Text. Indeed, its definition
of trade secret exactly parallels the definition in the Dunkel TRIPS Text.36
However, as with the Dunkel TRIPS Text, the NAFTA does not provide the
fullest measure of protection in this area. It repeats verbatim the Dunkel TRIPS
Text's definition of "manner contrary to honest commercial practices, ,37 includ-
ing the use of a gross negligence standard, and leaving open the possibility that
effective protection will be provided only against acquisition, not use.
In fact, trade secrets are one of the few areas where the protection provided under
the NAFTA is less than that contained in the Dunkel TRIPS Text. The NAFTA
requires protection for trade secrets only when they are in tangible form ;38 the Dun-
kel TRIPS Text has no such requirement. A strict interpretation of this requirement
(which stems from current Mexican law) could impose an unnecessary burden on
technology development.
With respect to marketing data, the NAFTA improves on the Dunkel TRIPS
33. Id. para. 3.
34. IFAC Report, supra note 19, at 20.
35. Dunkel Draft, supra note 4, art. 39, para. 3.
36. See NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1711, para. 1.
37. Id. art. 1721.
38. Id. art. 1711, para. 2.
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Text, but still does not go far enough. Like the Dunkel TRIPS Text, the NAFTA
provides for protection of registration data for pharmaceutical and agricultural
chemicals utilizing new chemical entities, but not for those utilizing old chemical
entities; it also does not specify the period of protection. 39 The NAFTA, however,
does provide protection for pharmaceuticals and agrichemicals against me-too
registration, requiring such protection for five years;a" unfortunately, the NAFTA
limits this protection to those products utilizing new chemical entities. The
NAFTA also contains language that may allow a period of protection of less than
five years.41 These provisions on marketing data, while a good start, do not
provide protection as broad as is necessary, nor as strong as that currently provided
in the United States.
The clear trend in industrialized countries is towards protection of trade secrets
and proprietary data. The provisions in the Dunkel TRIPS Text and the NAFTA
are a welcome step towards providing such protection on an international level.
However, these agreements contain only half measures, which will not provide
the full protection that is warranted. Future agreements should incorporate a plain
negligence standard with respect to third-party acquisition of trade secrets and
should clearly prohibit further use and dissemination of unfairly acquired informa-
tion. In addition, protection of marketing data should be tightened and made more
effective than it is under either the NAFTA or the Dunkel TRIPS Text.
ml. Patent Protection
A. SCOPE OF PROTECTION
The Dunkel TRIPS Text provides a fairly good baseline for the scope of patent
protection, requiring in general that patents be available for all products and
processes that are new, involve an inventive step, and are capable of industrial
application.42 It also forbids discrimination in patentability on the basis of field
of technology or on the place of invention or production.43
However, the Dunkel TRIPS Text allows limited exclusions from patentability
for reasons of protecting public order and morality, protecting life and health,
and avoiding serious environmental harm." While such provisions are common
in national patent laws, they may be used for protectionist reasons. Even more
troubling is the fact that the Dunkel TRIPS Text allows several areas of technology
to be excluded from the requirement of patent protection. Some of these are key
sectors of research and technological innovation.
39. Id. para. 5.
40. Id. para. 6.
41. Id.
42. Dunkel Draft, supra note 4, art. 27, para. 1, which also provides that these last two require-
ments can be considered to be synonymous with "nonobvious" and "useful." Id. n. 1.
43. Id.
44. Id. para. 2.
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The Dunkel TRIPS Text does not require patentability for diagnostic, therapeu-
tic, and surgical methods.45 It also does not require patentability for several
forms of biotechnology; while it provides protection to microorganisms and plant
varieties, this does not extend to transgenic plants and animals. 46 The Dunkel
TRIPS Text also allows exclusion from patentability for essentially biological
processes for producing plants and animals (not including microbiological pro-
cesses). 47 Because of these exclusions the Dunkel TRIPS Text does not give
sufficient protection to investors in biotechnology, despite the importance of this
field and the significant investments required for biotechnological developments.
The NAFTA contains similar flawed provisions on the scope of patent protec-
tion. It also provides for protection for all new and useful product and process
inventions and forbids discrimination on the basis of field of technology or on the
place of invention or production. 48 The NAFTA also allows exclusions from
patentability on certain public policy grounds49 and follows the Dunkel TRIPS
Text in not requiring patentability for diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical meth-
ods,5 o for transgenic plants and animals, 51 and for essentially biological processes
for producing plants and animals (not including microbiological processes).52
Despite these exclusions, the NAFTA's broad provision for nondiscrimination
as to field of technology will help to alleviate some aspects of Canadian and
Mexican law that have provided less than adequate protection to patent holders.
Most notably, the NAFTA has required Canada to dismantle its system of compul-
sory licensing that discriminates against pharmaceutical products, and guards
against any future use of such a system. Also, Mexico will have to assure adequate
patent protection for computer software and some biotechnology inventions,
which it does not do now.
However, the NAFTA repeats the Dunkel TRIPS Text's mistake by not requir-
ing patentability for inventions in extremely important fields of technology, espe-
cially biotechnology. Many industrialized countries, including the United States,
have vibrant and growing biotechnology industries. The United States has recog-
nized the need to encourage research in this field, and provides full protection for
transgenic organisms.53 The European Patent Office also allows plants and ani-
mals that are not varieties to be patented. 4 Allowing derogations from patentabil-
ity in this field will discourage investment in biotechnology and make companies
loath to export biotechnological products and processes.
45. Id. art. para. 3, cl. a.
46. Id. art. cl. b.
47. Id.
48. NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1709, para. 7.
49. Id. para. 2.
50. Id. para. 3, cl. a.
51. Id. cl. b.
52. Id. cl. c.
53. IFAC Report, supra note 19, at 17.
54. Id. at 16.
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Intellectual property laws that do not cover important new technologies are
not keeping up with significant advances being made in such fields as health,
agriculture, and waste disposal. The United States needs to ensure that the NAFTA
nations respect intellectual property rights in biotechnology as well as other mod-
em technologies. In fact, the United States' initial refusal to sign the Rio biodiver-
sity treaty was mainly prompted by the treaty's lack of respect for intellectual
property rights. The NAFTA negotiators should not have allowed the patentability
exclusions to remain in the agreement; Uruguay Round negotiators should strive
to remove them from any eventual TRIPS agreement.
B. PROTECTION GRANTED
The Dunkel TRIPS Text requires that product patent holders be able to prevent
the unauthorized making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing of the
subject matter of the patent.55 Process patent holders must be able to prevent the
unauthorized use of the process, as well as the use, sale, offer for sale, or importing
of the direct product of the process.56 The NAFTA contains almost identical
language on patent protection, 57 but does not require the right to prohibit the
importation of the subject matter of a product patent.
Both agreements, however, allow exceptions to exclusive patent rights. The
terms of these exceptions, which are identical in the two agreements, provide
grounds for concern. Both agreements allow exceptions if those exceptions "do
not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account
of the legitimate interests of third parties." 5 The double use of "unreasonably"--
a vague standard- and the reference to the interests of third parties allow broad
interpretation of this language. If signatories to the NAFTA do adopt a broad
interpretation, much of the protection given to patent holders could effectively be
negated.
The protection granted to intellectual property rights will never be absolute, nor
should they be. However, if an international agreement on intellectual property is
to provide a high level of protection, any allowed exceptions to exclusive rights
must be narrowly and carefully drawn. Both the Dunkel TRIPS Text and the
NAFTA fail to do so; this area is another in which negotiators of future agreements
will have to improve on the NAFTA.
C. COMPULSORY LICENSING
Compulsory licenses, particularly for patents, are a means by which some
countries limit the rights of intellectual property holders. These licenses are often
55. Dunkel Draft, supra note 4, art. 28, para. 1, cl. a.
56. Id. c. b.
57. NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1709, para. 5.
58. Dunkel Draft, supra note 4, art. 30; see NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1709, para. 6.
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used in a manner severely detrimental to right holders; prohibition of, or at least
limitations on, such measures must be a goal of international agreements to protect
intellectual property.
The Dunkel TRIPS Text contains limits on the practice of compulsory licens-
ing. 59 For patents, it permits such licensing only when previous efforts have been
made to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial
terms, and such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of
time. 60 It also requires that the license be nonexclusive, that the scope and duration
of the license be limited, and that the right holder receive adequate remuneration. 6,
While the Dunkel TRIPS Text thus provides some protection against compul-
sory licensing, it does so by imposing conditions on governments that issue
compulsory licenses, rather than by limiting the circumstances in which they
can be granted (for example, in situations of national emergency or adjudicated
violations of competition law). The latter method of protection would be more
effective.
The NAFTA's provisions on compulsory patent licensing are basically identical
to those in the Dunkel TRIPS Text.62 It, too, imposes conditions on compulsory
licenses rather than limiting their availability. The NAFTA's provision that patent
rights not be subject to discrimination based on whether the good was imported
or locally produced,63 which mirrors language in the Dunkel TRIPS Text, 4 will
further limit the availability of compulsory patent licensing and will force parties
to recognize importation as meeting any local patent working requirement for
compulsory licensing purposes. Recognition of importing as satisfying such re-
quirements is very important; local production is often prohibitively expensive
given the costs of setting up new production facilities and the relatively small size
of many national markets. In addition, the NAFTA's requirement of nondiscrimi-
nation by field of technology has required Canada to dismantle its system of
compulsory licensing for pharmaceuticals.
With respect to dependent patent compulsory licensing, the NAFTA provides
far more protection than the Dunkel TRIPS Text does. The Dunkel TRIPS Text
contains some limits on this practice, allowing it only when the second patent
involves an "important technical advance of considerable economic significance
in relation to the invention claimed in the first patent." 65 While this is a step in
the right direction, a total limit on dependent patent compulsory licensing would
be preferable to protect the rights of the patent holder. Barring such a limit,
restricting dependent patent compulsory licensing to a situation where the second
59. Dunkel Draft, supra note 4, arts. 21 (trademarks) and 31 (patents).
60. Id. art. 31, cl. b.
61. Id. cis. d, c, h.
62. See NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1709, para. 10.
63. Id. para. 7.
64. Dunkel Draft, supra note 4, art. 27, para. 1.
65. Id. art. 31, cl. 1(i).
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patent constitutes a technical advance of considerably greater economic signifi-
cance than the first patent would be a better option. This action would prevent the
granting of compulsory licenses for a mere alernative process for the production of
a product that is already available by existing processes.
The NAFTA, however, leaves the Dunkel TRIPS Text in the dust in this area
by forbidding dependent patent compulsory licensing except as a remedy for an
adjudicated violation of competition law. 66 This part of the agreement is a good
example of how the United States need not accept existing inadequate proposals
as anything but a floor on what is possible in international agreements.
IV. Trademark Protection
Trademarks and their relatives, service marks, are often among a company's
most valuable assets. To be truly effective, a system for trademark protection
should include a registration system that provides for examination and prosecution
of applications, publication of trademarks, and an opportunity for opposition and
cancellation of trademarks by petition.
The Dunkel TRIPS Text provides such effective protection for trademarks, as
well as for service marks .67 It does not permit discrimination in granting trademark
protection based on the nature of goods or services involved.68 It also provides
that if a nation requires use of a trademark to maintain registration, use by another
person under the control of the trademark owner is to be sufficient. 69 The Dunkel
TRIPS Text provides for full contractual rights for trademark owners, including
the right to assign a trademark without transfer of the business to which the mark
belongs; however, it allows conditions on licensing and assignment.7 °
While the Dunkel TRIPS Text allows limited exceptions to trademark rights
(such as fair use of descriptive terms), any such exceptions must take into account
the legitimate interests of the trademark owner and other persons.71 The Dunkel
TRIPS Text prohibits special requirements that encumber the use of a trademark
in commerce, including requirements of a use that reduces the function of the
trademark as an indication of source, or use with another trademark.72
The NAFTA also provides for an effective scheme of trademark and service
mark protection; 73 in fact, nearly all of the NAFTA's provisions in this area are
identical to those in the Dunkel TRIPS Text. One of the few significant differences
66. NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1709, para. 10, cl. 1.
67. Dunkel Draft, supra note 4, art. 15.
68. Id. para. 4
59. Id. art. 19, para. 2.
70. Id. art. 21.
71. Id. art. 17.
72. Id. art. 20.
73. NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1708.
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is that the NAFTA mandates a use requirement to maintain registration, 74 whereas
the Dunkel TRIPS Text does not.
Both the Dunkel TRIPS Text and the NAFTA provide a high level of protection
for trademarks. Unfortunately, neither requires that the registration procedure
include an opportunity for interested parties to oppose registration. In addition,
neither the NAFTA nor the Dunkel TRIPS Text deal with the effect of prior
trademark use in a NAFTA country other than the country of registration. This
oversight could present a problem in the situation in which different persons
register a trademark in all three NAFTA countries; because of adversely held
rights, moving goods across borders could become problematic. This potential
problem may need further treatment after the NAFTA comes into effect. Similar
problems will arise under any eventual multilateral agreement on trade-related
intellectual property; negotiators would be wise to deal explicitly with this issue
within any agreement.
Despite these flaws, both the Dunkel TRIPS Text and the NAFTA fulfill the
requirements of adequate trademark protection, and their provisions in this area
are a useful model for future negotiations.
V. Geographical Indications
Geographical indications of origin can be valuable identifying information for
products. Identifying a product as a California Chablis, or a Coney Island hot
dog, provides important information to the consumer and is a valuable marketing
tool for the seller. However, national laws must protect against deceptive use of
such indication.
The Dunkel TRIPS Text provides for protection of geographical indications by
requiring signatories to provide a means to prevent use of such indications in a
false and misleading way.7 5 The Parties must also provide means to revoke, or
deny registration to, trademarks that contain false and misleading geographical
indications.76
The NAFTA contains similar provisions.7 However, unlike the Dunkel TRIPS
Text, the NAFTA does not contain more detailed provisions to cover wines and
spirits.78 Inclusion of these provisions in the Dunkel TRIPS Text reflects the
importance Europeans attach to geographic indications in such products; while
such provisions may be appropriate in the multilateral context, their absence in
the NAFTA should not have much practical effect in the North American market.
However, these schemes of protection for geographical indications may not be
enough to provide full protection to their legitimate users. One particular concern
74. Id. para. 8.
75. Dunkel Draft, supra note 4, art. 22, para. 2.
76. Id. para. 3.
77. NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1712.
78. Dunkel Draft, supra note 4, arts. 23, 24.
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is that the NAFTA limits to the signatories to the agreement protection for a
trademark acquired before an appellation became protected in its country of
origin. Therefore, under the NAFTA, other countries could still conclude separate
bilateral agreements with a NAFTA country that would provide for appellations
to preclude or supersede trademarks.
VI. Protection of Existing Subject Matter
International agreements on intellectual property rights must strike a balance
between protecting intellectual property right holders and avoiding unfairness
to those whose actions were not infringing under national law until domestic
implementation of the international agreement. The balance should lean towards
the right holders, as the whole point of such an agreement is their protection.
The Dunkel TRIPS Text contains very inadequate and convoluted language on
this issue. It allows signatories to limit the remedies available to a right holder
for activities that become infringing because of national legislation implementing
the agreement, when such activities were commenced (or with respect to which
a significant investment was made) before the ratification of the agreement by
that signatory.7 9 Therefore, under the Dunkel TRIPS Text, activities that become
infringing due to the agreement can continue after ratification and enactment of
the agreement into national law, with the right holder powerless to stop those
infringements. The Dunkel TRIPS Text's rule that in such cases equitable remu-
neration shall be paid to the right holder' ° is too vague to be adequate. Since the
NAFTA incorporates wholesale the language of the Dunkel TRIPS Text,8 the
NAFTA, in general, provides no improvement over the Dunkel TRIPS Text in
this area.
However, the NAFTA is a considerable improvement in one area related to
preexisting subject matter: pipeline protection for products with a long lead time
between application for patent protection and actual marketing. This protection
applies in a country that did not provide patent protection for a particular type of
product until so required by an international agreement, and requires that country
to grant protection for the product for the term of protection always granted by
another Party to the agreement.
The NAFTA contains such protection for pharmaceutical and agricultural
chemical products.8 2 Its provisions are better than those in the Dunkel TRIPS
Text, which provides protection only for patents filed after the entry into force
of the agreement. 83 This significant advance in transitional protection should serve
79. See id. art. 70, para. 4.
80. Id.
81. See NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1720, para. 4.
82. Id. art. 1709, para. 4.
83. Dunkel Draft, supra note 4, art. 70, para. 8.
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as a model for future agreements, including any resulting from the Uruguay
Round.
VII. Parallel Importing
Intellectual property protection in the multinational arena raises an important
set of issues regarding territoriality. To gain full benefit from their rights, right
holders should be able to make, use, or sell the subject matter of their rights on
a country-by-country basis. The practice of parallel importing and the concept of
exhaustion of rights eliminate the ability to maintain this control. However, most
countries do not prohibit parallel imports. Even the United States offers only
limited protection in this area; for example, trademark holders continue to have
problems with the importation into the United States of gray-market goods. A
prohibition of such imports should be a part of the developing regime of intellec-
tual property protection.
Unfortunately, neither the NAFTA nor the Dunkel TRIPS Text includes explicit
prohibition of parallel imports. Furthermore, the Dunkel TRIPS Text explicitly
provides that its provisions shall not be used to address the issue of exhaustion
of intellectual property. 8' This language could easily be read to authorize applica-
tion of exhaustion; it would have been preferable if the Dunkel TRIPS Text had
not mentioned exhaustion at all.
The NAFTA contains nothing on exhaustion and also does not establish any
principles of free movement of goods that would require signatories to allow
parallel importing. Therefore, under the NAFTA, the territoriality of intellectual
property rights remains a matter for national law, and the signatories are free to
protect right holders by prohibiting parallel imports.
Territoriality of intellectual property rights will have to be dealt with in any
future agreements. The NAFTA's approach-to ignore the issue-is better than
the Dunkel TRIPS Text's seemingly innocent but potentially dangerous language.
However, laying to rest the concept of exhaustion and explicitly prohibiting
parallel importing would ensure a higher level of protection for intellectual prop-
erty rights.
VIII. Enforcement Issues
For right holders to be truly protected, intellectual property laws must be
accompanied by effective powers of enforcement. Right holders should have
access to effective, equitable, and nondiscriminatory procedures to protect and
enforce their rights and to obtain remedies for violations of those rights. Remedies
should include the possibility of injunctions, and border measures should be
available to prevent infringing goods from entering into commerce. However,
84. Id. art. 6.
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the national means of protecting intellectual property rights should not be used
as a trade barrier against legitimate goods, and due process should be observed
in all procedures.
Both the Dunkel TRIPS Text and the NAFTA contain enforcement provisions85
that adequately protect right holders' interests, and ensure that such measures are
fairly applied and will not serve as trade barriers. Such provisions are commend-
able; hopefully, signatories will devote ample resources to applying national
enforcement measures. Among the various enforcement provisions, two particu-
lar types, border measures and criminal sanctions, deserve special mention.
A. BORDER MEASURES
In order to fully protect intellectual property right holders, governments should
take effective measures at the border to prevent infringing from entering into
commerce in that country. Governments should be able to suspend, for a limited
period of time, entry of suspected counterfeit or pirated goods. Such measures
must, however, be accompanied by fair judicial or administrative procedures to
make a determination on the nature of the goods.
Both the NAFTA and the Dunkel TRIPS Text provide for such measures.8 6
However, they both provide for them to be applicable after customs clearance.
This mechanism is not as strong as one that would directly stop infringing imports
at the border; the latter approach would be preferable in future agreements.
Both the Dunkel TRIPS Text and the NAFTA contain special expedited border
procedures for counterfeit (trademark infringing) or pirate (copyright infringing)
goods. While such measures are appropriate for those types of goods, both
agreements also allow signatories to extend these special measures to imported
goods that infringe intellectual property rights other than copyrights and trade-
marks.87 As opposed to piracy and counterfeiting, which are easier factual deter-
minations to make, patent and trade secret rights may not lend themselves to such
expedited special procedures. Extending special expedited procedures into such
areas raises a risk of overzealous enforcement; their use under the NAFTA will
have to be watched to ensure that this problem does not arise.
B. CRIMINAL PROCEDURES AND PENALTIES
Intellectual property protection should also include criminal sanctions for cer-
tain violations. Such sanctions are particularly appropriate for counterfeiting and
piracy, which are generally willful violations. Such sanctions should be adequate
to deter infringement, but should also provide for the seizure and destruction of
85. Id. arts. 42-61; NAFTA, supra note 3, arts. 1174-1118.
86. Dunkel Draft, supra note 4, art. 44, para. 1; id. arts. 51-60; NAFTA, supra note 3, art.
1715, para. 2, cl. c; id. arts. 1716, 1718.
87. Dunkel Draft, supra note 4, art. 51; NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1718, para. 1.
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goods to prevent further injury to the legitimate right holder. However, such
strong measures are not appropriate in all cases. Applying criminal law to violators
of intellectual property rights is a severe measure; such sanctions should be used
only where violators commit infringements willfully and on a commercial scale.
Both the Dunkel TRIPS Text and the NAFTA provide for criminal sanctions
for willful copyright piracy and trademark counterfeiting on a commercial scale."8
The NAFTA allows criminal sanctions in other intellectual property areas, but,
wisely, also limits their use to willful infringements that are on a commercial
scale.8 9 The Dunkel TRIPS Text does not provide for such limits, raising the risk
of use of criminal law in inappropriate circumstances. 90
IX. Cultural Industries Exclusion
One final area remains in which the NAFTA negotiators came to a compromise
that would have been better not arrived at: the cultural industries exclusion granted
to Canada. 91 This exclusion, which is already present in the U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Agreement, is not actually in the intellectual property chapter of the
NAFTA; rather, it is part of the chapter on exceptions. The exclusion allows
Canada broad derogations from the NAFTA's intellectual property provisions,
as well as its obligations under the services and investment texts, for its "cultural
industries." 92 While the Canadians insisted on extending this exclusion to the
NAFTA, and in effect it may have been the price of the NAFTA, it is still
regrettable that it ended up in the agreement.
Such a broad-based exclusion can be used to effectively nullify most of the
benefits granted by the NAFTA's intellectual property provisions. The United
States' media interests, which rank among its most productive and competitive
industries, are especially prone to injury, as their valuable exports, such as books,
newspapers, television programs, and films, can be discriminated against in the
large open market that the NAFTA supposedly creates. The one saving grace is
that the NAFTA allows retaliation by the United States if Canada makes use of
this exclusion. 93 The United States Government should be ready, willing, and able
to use this defensive weapon, and should ensure that Canada knows it will do so.
This exclusion is peculiar to the U.S.-Canada relationship, which involves
great geographic and linguistic proximity. The United States should make it clear
that similar provisions will not be acceptable in any future agreements. Certainly,
the absence of any similar exclusion for Mexico in the NAFTA demonstrates that
other negotiating partners of the United States will not be able to use "cultural
88. Dunkel Draft, supra note 4, art. 61; NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1717, para. 1.
89. NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1717, para. 3.
90. Dunkel Draft, supra note 4, art. 61.
91. See NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 2106 and annex 2106.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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industries" as an excuse for providing less than adequate protection to intellectual
property.
X. Conclusion
The NAFTA, while still imperfect, represents a major improvement in protec-
tion for intellectual property rights. By holding the United States' major trading
partners, Canada and Mexico, to a high standard of protection, the NAFTA
builds substantially on the ongoing U.S.-led process of improving protection for
intellectual property rights worldwide. It also signals that the United States will
not settle for inadequate and ineffective protection for intellectual property rights
from its trading partners. The United States' NAFTA negotiators would not accept
the Dunkel TRIPS Text's provisions in many areas; rather, they used the Dunkel
TRIPS Text as a starting point and then built upon it, increasing the protection
provided.
The NAFTA will serve as a model for future agreements, just as the Dunkel
TRIPS Text served as a model for parts of the NAFTA. As the Dunkel TRIPS
Text still suffers from many flaws, the process may now work in reverse, and the
NAFTA may influence the direction of the Uruguay Round TRIPS negotiations. In
general, the NAFTA's intellectual property provisions should not be viewed as
simply a model for future agreements. Rather, they should be considered a plat-
form to be built on, much as the NAFTA itself built on the Dunkel TRIPS Text.
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